Diana Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc. : Appellants\u27 Reply to Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Diana Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc. :
Appellants' Reply to Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
James B. Hawkes; Bob W. Warnick; Attorneys for Appellant;
Robert F. Orton; Attorney for Respondent;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., No. 18093 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2717
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------·----~·-------------------------------~~--------
DIJ\NA BEHRENS, individually ) 
and as Guardian ad Litem cf 
N.~THJ\N ALAN BEHRENS, ) 
Appellants, ) Caae Ne. 18093 
v. ) 
PALEIG-H EILLS HOSPITAL, INCo ) 
.Rdspondent. ) 
A2PELLANTS' REPLY TO 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
C:)URT OF SALT . LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE G. HAL TAYLOR 
JAMES E. HAWKES 
DOB W. WARNICK 
3{11 Gump & Ayers Bldg. 
2~20 South 1300 East 
ROB2RT F. ORTON 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
S3lt Lake City, Utah 84101 
521-3800 
Attorneys f0r Respondent. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
486-3751 
Attorneys for Appellants 
JUN 3 0 1982 
.....,..... ......... --------------·---·--·--......... Cl~r~ Su~~'3 Coi..-rt. Ute~1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIANA BEHRENS, individually ) 
and as Guardian ad Litem of 
NATHAN ALAN BEHRENS, ) 
Appellants, ) Case No. 18093 
v. ) 
RALEIGH HILLS HOSPITAL, INC. ) 
Respondent. ) 
APPELLANTS' REPLY TO 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF.UTAH 
THE HONORABLE G. HAL TAYLOR 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
521-3800 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
JAMES E. HAWKES 
BOB W. WARNICK 
301 Gump & Ayers Bldg. 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
486-3751 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIANA BEHRENS, individually ) 
and as Guardian ad Litem of 
NATHAN ALAN BEHRENS, ) Case No. 18093 
Appellants, ) 
) APPELLANTS'REPLY TO v. RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
RALEIGH HILLS HOSPITAL, INC. I ) 
Respondent. ) 
BACKGROUND 
The Utah Supreme Court granted appellants' Petition for 
Review after the District Court refused to allow them to amend 
their complaint to include punitive damages. The amendment was 
requested after appellants' $100,000 jury verdict was set aside 
by the trial judge because of errors in the instructions. Rule 
15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows that leave to 
amend a party's pleading shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. Appellants ask only to be allowed to prove their puni-
tive claim at trial. Respondent will not be prejudiced in any 
way in that appellants' claim for punitive damages is based 
upon the same facts, the same parties, the same incident, the 
same evidence, the same testimony, and the same documents. Respon-
dents' brief adds nothing new or different to the argument than has· 
already been brought before the court in respondent's Motion for 
Summary Disposition. Appellants respond with essentially their 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANTS' MOTION WAS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE cobRT. 
Appellants brought their motion pursuant to a notice of 
hearing on appellants' motion to amend complaint, and memorandum 
of support and authorities. 
Said motion was noticed up on the court's calendar. At 
the hearing of the motion, attorneys for appellants were there, 
respondent's counsel was there, and court called it, the court 
heard argmnent, the court made its order and the respondent 
even prepared the order which was entitled "Order Denying Plain-
tiffs' Motion to Amend Complaintf)" Said Order stated: 
"Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to assert 
a claim for punitive damages came on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, one of 
the judges of the above entitled court at Court's 
Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 6th day of 
October, 1981, at 2:00 P.M., plaintiff being present 
in court and represented by her attorney James E. 
Hawkes; and defendant being present in court and 
represented by its attorney, Robert F. Orton, of the 
firm of Marsden, Orton and Liljenquist; and the court 
having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file, 
having heard argument of cousel, having been fully 
advised in the premises and good cause appearing .... " 
[Emphasis added] 
The order went on to deny appellants' right to amend their 
complaint. Reviewing the file, appellants cannot find a plead-
ing solely entitled "Motion," but respondent's Order determined 
that appellants' motion came on regularly. 
Appellants have not filed an amended complaint since 
appellants do not have any right to file an amended complaint 
until the court so orders and then only to the extent as ordered 
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by the court. Appellants' Memorandum of Support gave respondent 
ample opportunity ot understand what appellants desired in their 
amended complaint. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANTS' PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT 
IS NOT UNTIMELY AND WILL NOT ASSERT A 
NEW CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. The statute of limitations of an action against a health 
care provider (UCA 78-14-4) states: 
"No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is conunenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to· exceed 
four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence." 
Four years has not run since the death of appellants' father/ 
husband. The only question is whether two years have run since 
appellants knew or should have known of their claim for punitive 
damages. The requirement, as stated in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 
P2d 144 (1979), is, 
"The discover of the injury means discovery of the 
injury and the negligence which resulted in the 
injury." [Emphasis added] 
At the time the original complaint was filed, the appel-
lants had no knowledge of the degree of respondent's negligence. 
A major factor discovered within the last two years for which 
punitive damages are sought is respondent's actual conduct in 
relationship to the promises made by their advertising and their 
expensive charges. The fact is that respondent's conduct was 
not known at that time, and was only ascertained as discovery 
progressed and as other facts which have co'.l.,v~ +--:"' ~i.....,_ -i-~- - - • • 
--3 
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of the general public were learned about their practices. such 
knowledge was obtained during the last two years. Now appel-
lants can indeed bring their claim for punitive damages. 
B. In Peterson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 79 u 213, 
8 P2d 627 (1932), at 220, the court states: 
"Where the amendment merely expands or arnplif ies what 
is alleges in the original complaint, even though 
imperfectly, in support of the cause of action, it is 
properly allows." 
Later on Peterson, supra, at 221 stated: 
"In a tort action an amendment may vary the statement 
of the original complaint as to the manner in which 
the plaintiff was injured as to the manner of the 
defendant's breach of duty, 49 CoJ. 517: Sargeant v. 
Union Fuel Co., supra; Fort Worth Belt R. Co. v. Jones, 
Tex. Civ. App. (182 SW 1184)." 
POINT IIIo 
A LETTER OF INTENT FILED BY APPELLANTS 
DOES NOT BAR APPELLANTS' REQUEST TO AMEND. 
Appellants' original punitive damage claim falls within 
their notice of intent to conunence action as required by UCA 
78-14-8. The difficulty with this statute is that it presupposes 
that all plaintiffs have the same knowledge when they commence 
a malpractice action as they will have by the day before trial. 
Medical malpractice is very complex. It takes years of dis-
covery. Experts must be sought for comprehension and prepara-
tion. Except in the most simple cases, plaintiffs cannot be 
expected to have the knowledge of whether a punitive claim 
should or should not be made. If the statute is to require 
the inclusion of all claims, whether known or unknown, then 
many health care providers will have totally erroneous claims Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
made against them because plaintiffs will have no choice but to 
include such claims prior to discovery. The statute's purpose 
is to protect doctors from having their reputations maligned by 
malpractice actions and induce out-of-court settlement. The 
above mentioned result is contrary to the legislative intent. 
Respondent has made several motions regarding appellants' 
letter of intent. As stated previously, appellants' punitive 
claims relate solely to the degree of respondent's negligence. 
If Appellants' letter of intent fulfills the statutory require-
ments to allow them to bring their claim of negligence, then 
any claims of punitive negligence have the same identical basis. 
The degree of respondent's negligence was uniquely within its 
knowledge since the beginning of the action. 
In order to crystalize the court's attention on the more 
important issues of this appeal, appellants have served a new 
letter of intent to commence an action upon respondent which 
includes a claim for punitive damages demand, thus matting this 
issue. 
In Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, (1980) 617 P2d 
352, the court found that any technical difficulties in the 
letter of intent could be remedied simply be serving another 
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POINT IV. 
UTAH'S WRONGFUL DEATH STATUES DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
The Utah Wrongful Death Statute, UCA 78-11-7, states: 
"In every action under this and the next preceding sec-
tion, such damages may be given as under all the circum-
stances of the case may be just." 
Appellants grant the stubbornnes of the court without the 
state to accept punitive damages in a wrongful death action. 
However, the question has not been decided by Utah law. In 
Morrison v. Perry, 140 P2d 722, 104 U 151 (1943), the court 
discussed the statute in relation to compensatory damages and 
provided a definition of compensatory damages. Defendants are 
not sought to be punished by compensatory damages. They were 
simply to compensate the plaintiff for his loss. Appellants 
entirely agree with this definition but it is a definition 
of compensatory damages and not punitive damages. The question 
remains, what damages in a wrongful death action are "just?" 
This question must be answered for the first time by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
Punitive damages measure a degree of wrong and are not a 
cause of action. In Powers v. Taylor, 14 U2d 152, 379 P2d 380 
(1963), the court discussed punitive damages: 
"Whether such damages are allowable is not dependent 
upon the classification of the wrognful act, nor upon 
the nature of the injury but upon the manner and 
intent with which it is done. If the wrongful act 
by which one injures another is done willfully and 
maliciously, our law allows imposition of punitive 
damages as punishment to defendant for such conduct, 
and as a warning to him and others against it." 
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Punitive damages are allowed in any cause of action if 
the degree of wrong rises to the level of willful and malicious. 
Whether punitive damages are allowed in a wrongful death action 
should be no different. In Terry v. Zions Co-operative Merchan-
tile Institution, 605 P2d 314 (1979), the court found: 
"The purpose of a punitive or exemplary damage award 
is not to compensate the party harmed but rather to 
punish the wrongdoer, to deter him from similar acts 
in the future, and to provide fair warning to others 
similarly situated that such conduct is not tdlerated." 
Thus, punitive damages are not a private right but a public 
right. It is the social policy that certain conduct will not be 
accepted in the community. If the conduct is of such a nature 
that punitive damages are demanded had the victim lived, then 
how does the social policy differ if the same- conduct leads 
to the victim's death? This gives credence to the ironic comment 
heard by lawyers from other lawyers and laymen that if you are 
going to commit a wrongful act, it is better to kill your victim 
than to maim. 
DATED June 30 ' 1982. 
---
Respectfully submitted, 
~~~ z_ ~~ 
JAMES E. HAWKES 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed two copies of the foregoing to Robert 
F. Orton and T. Richard Davis, attorneys for respondent, 68 
South Main, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, June 30 
1982. 
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